Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Brooks v. Brooks : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randall J. Holmgren; Holmgren, Arnold & Wiggins; Attorney for Appellee.
Paul H. Liapis; Liapis, Gray & Stegall; Kim M. Luhn; Green & Luhn; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Brooks v. Brooks, No. 920733 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4726

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

VWb

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOANN BROOKS (NUNLEY),
Plaintiff, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant,

Case No. 920733-CA
District Court No. 880904192

v.

Priority No. 15

THOMAS M. BROOKS,
Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLEE
AND CROSS-APPELLANT,
JOANN NUNLEY
APPEAL FROM ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE
ENTERED OCTOBER 2, 1992 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, BY THE HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT
RANDALL J. HOLMGREN
HOLMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS
American Plaza One, Suite 404
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-4333
(801) 328-1151 (Fax)
Attorney for Appellee
and Cross-Appellant
PAUL H. LIAPIS
LIAPIS, GRAY & STEGALL
48 Market Street, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 532-6996
KIM M. LUHN
GREEN & LUHN
9 Exchange Place, Suite 722
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 531-7444
Attorneys for Appellant
and Cross-Appellee

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

JAN 1 0 1994

Jr

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
)

JOANN BROOKS (NUNLEY),
Plaintiff, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant,
v.
THOMAS M. BROOKS,
Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 920733-CA
District Court No. 880904192
Priority No. 15

)
)

REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLEE
AND CROSS-APPELLANT,
JOANN NUNLEY
APPEAL FROM ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE
ENTERED OCTOBER 2, 1992 IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, BY THE HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT
RANDALL J. HOLMGREN
HOLMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS
American Plaza One, Suite 404
77 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-4333
(801) 328-1151 (Fax)
Attorney for Appellee
and Cross-Appellant
PAUL H. LIAPIS
LIAPIS, GRAY & STEGALL
48 Market Street, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 532-6996
KIM M. LUHN
GREEN & LUHN
9 Exchange Place, Suite 722
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 531-7444
Attorneys for Appellant
and Cross-Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

ii

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY
ARGUMENT

iii
1

CONCLUSION

15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page(s)
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah App.
1988)
16
Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69 (Utah App.1991)

7

Erwin v. Erwin. 773 P.2d 847 (Utah App. 1989)

6

Mauqhan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989)

16

Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992)

2

Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d 907 (Utah App. 1988)

6

Porco v. Porco. 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988)

16

Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989)

7

Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989)

5

Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah
1977)
12
Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985)
(per curiam)

2

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(3)

12

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5

9,13,14

ii

COURT RULES CITED
Utah R. Civ. P. 43(b)

11

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)

5

Utah R. Evid. 602

4

Utah R. Evid. 702

4

Utah R. Evid. 703

4
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.
Rebuttable guidelines.

Determination of amount of support

(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the
amount granted by prior court order unless there
has been a material change or circumstance on
the part of the obligor or obligee.
(2) If the court finds sufficient evidence to
rebut the guidelines, the court shall establish
support after considering all relevant factors,
including but not limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the
parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(f) the ages of the parties; and
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee
for the support of others.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5.
income•

Determination of gross income - Imputed

(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income"
includes:
(a)
prospective income from any source,
including
nonearned
sources, except
under
Subsection (3); and
(b)
income
from
salaries,
wages,
commission, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts
from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay,
pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from

iii

previous marriages, annuities, captial gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation
benefits, unemployment compensation, disability
insurance benefits, and payments from "nonmeanstested government programs.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(3).

Definitions

(3) A written finding or specific finding on
the record supporting the conclusion that
complying with a provision of the guidelines or
ordering an award amount resulting from use of
the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate,
or not in the best interest of a child in a
particular case is sufficient to rebut the
presumption in that case.

iv

ARGUMENT
1.

THE TRIAL COURT, BASED ON THE EVIDENCE BEFORE
IT, ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO MODIFY
THE DIVORCE DECREE TO REQUIRE DEFENDANT TO PAY
AN INCREASED AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT.

In his Reply Brief, Defendant, in the process of replying to
Plaintiff's argument on cross-appeal that the trial court abused its
discretion

in refusing

to modify the divorce

decree to

require

Defendant to pay an increased amount of child support, directs this
court to merely a portion of the changed circumstances that have
occurred since the entry of the original decree of divorce.

Such a

position is disingenuous, to say the least, inasmuch as all of the
material changed circumstances should be considered when reviewing
whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to modify
Defendant's child support obligation.

See Woodward v. Woodward, 790

P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736,
739 (Utah App. 1992); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (1992).

The trial

c o u r t s refusal to modify the decree of divorce is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.

Muir, 841 P.2d at 739.

Defendant's argument in his Reply Brief amounts essentially to
the following:

Because Defendant's income as set forth in trial

Exhibit 11 is supported by admissible evidence, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to increase Defendant's child
support obligation.

Furthermore, in so doing, Defendant states, on

page one of his Reply Brief, that "there is absolutely no basis to
claim

that

these deposits

[i.e., the unexplained

Defendant's checking account] were unexplained."

1

deposits

into

With regard to Defendant's claim that there is "absolutely no
basis" that the deposits were unexplained, the trial court, in the
course

of

making

its

findings

concerning

Defendant's

income,

explicitly mentioned that Defendant received additional income that
the court was unable to specifically identify.
and Finding of Fact 7)
Defendant's
consideration

unexplained

(Record 222-23; 1056;

The trial court's observation regarding
income

of the totality

came

only

after

of the circumstances

painstaking
surrounding

Defendant's income, which included the trial court's observation of
the credibility of the witnesses and testimony given at trial.

See

Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Argument #1, p. 20.
Defendant, as previously stated, fails to direct the Court to
all of the material changed circumstances warranting a modification
of the original divorce decree so as to require Defendant to pay an
increased amount of child support.

The substantial change of

circumstances warranting such a modification in the instant case are
as follows:

First, Defendant's net income at the time of the

original decree was $1600.00 per month, as opposed to $3029.26 per
month at the time the petition for modification in the instant case
was filed (see Findings of Fact 4 and 5 and Brief of Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, Argument #1, p. 20 and Argument #4, pp. 36-37);
Second, Plaintiff's gross income at the time of the original decree
was $2390.60 per month as opposed to Plaintiff's income of $833.00
per month at the time the petition was filed, which amounts to more
than a sixty-five percent reduction (see Record at 1045; Finding of
Fact 6; and Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Argument #1, pp.
19-20 and Argument #4, p. 36); Third, the additional expenditures by
2

Plaintiff to maintain the minor child, Michelle, in private school,
pursuant to the parties' desires, as opposed to Michelle's private
preschool at the time of the original decree (see Record at 548-657;
1059; 1135, lines 6-7; 1139, lines 17-19; and Brief of Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, Argument #1, pp. 20-24; Argument #4, pp. 37-38);
and, since the original decree was entered, Plaintiff's loss of both
her health care benefits and her TWA flight benefits, requiring
additional expenditures on Michelle's behalf (see Record at 35-39;
41; 658-720, 1058; 1126; Plaintiff's Exhibit 5; and Brief of Appellee
and Cross-Appellant, Argument #4, p. 38).
In reply to Plaintiff's argument that the trial court abused its
discretion

by

refusing

to

impute

additional

income

based

on

Defendant's past-earnings history and lifestyle, Defendant admits
that he "worked on occasion since his medical retirement from the
L.A. Police Department," but then states, that "at the time of trial,
he was unable to [work] due to medical restrictions imposed by his
doctors."

Defendant's assertion concerning his inability to work is

totally devoid of any supporting citation to the record.
At trial, the court received evidence as to whether Defendant
was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
58).

(Record at 1243; 1256-

Notwithstanding the uncontroverted evidence that Defendant

continued working after obtaining his disability

(Record at 1243;

1255-58; 1260-62), the court abused its discretion by failing to find
that Defendant is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed or that
Defendant was disabled to the point that he cannot work.
of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Argument #5, pp. 38-41.

3

See Brief

Defendant also argues that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting Defendant's medical testimony without any
expert testimony or medical foundation.

In support of his argument,

Defendant claims that such testimony was admissible pursuant to Utah
Rule of Evidence 602.
Utah Rule of Evidence 602 allows a witness to testify to a
matter if the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. However,
Rule 602 is "subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to
opinion testimony by expert witnesses."
Evidence 702 states that

Additionally, Utah Rule of

"[i]f scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert . . . may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise."
While Defendant's testimony regarding his heart attack and the
medications he was taking was admissible because it was based on
personal knowledge, Defendant's testimony as to his disability rating
and

medical

condition,

without

any

medical

foundation,

was

inadmissible. By allowing such testimony, the trial court abused its
discretion by enabling Defendant to rebut

substantial contrary

evidence that he had worked to supplement his disability income.
Such testimony was self-serving, based on inadmissible hearsay, and
was highly prejudicial in terms of the trial court's refusal to grant
an increase in child support.

See Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d

84, 89 (Utah App. 1989) ("The critical factor is whether the expert
has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the

4

issues before it.");

See Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant,

Argument #7, pp. 43-44).
At page four of his Reply Brieff Defendant claims that by using
the

parties7

incomes

in the child

support

guideline worksheet,

Defendant's child support obligation would only be $250.00 per month.
Such a calculation, however, is not accurate. Based on a calculation
using the Child Support Obligation Worksheet set forth in Addendum C
of the Brief

of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Defendant's child

support obligation actually exceeds $300.00.

See Brief of Appellee

and Cross-Appellant, Argument #4, 35-38 and n.7.
2.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE TO REQUIRE
DEFENDANT TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE MINOR CHILD'S
PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES.

Although the trial court did not explicitly find that there had
been a substantial change in circumstances regarding the private
school expenses issue, the trial court's findings are sufficiently
detailed for appellate review.

See Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847,

848-49 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)); Painter v.
Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1991).
In his Reply Brief, Defendant, in the process of arguing that
the trial court abused its discretion to modify the divorce decree to
require Defendant to pay for a portion of Michelle's private school
expenses,

again

circumstances

fails

that

have

to

identify

substantially

or

consider

changed

modification of the original divorce decree.
findings establish

all

so as to

of

the

warrant

The trial court's

that there had been a substantial

change

in

circumstances in the incomes of both the parties since the original
5

divorce decree, i.e., more than a sixty-five percent reduction in
income for Plaintiff and more than a forty-five percent increase in
income for Defendant

(see Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant,

Argument #1, pp. 19-20). 1

Moreover, the findings, in addition to the

record, also establish that prior to the divorce becoming final, the
parties had enrolled Michelle in Westchester Lutheran School,2 a
private preschool, and that since the original decree, Plaintiff had
expended substantial amounts of money for the enrollment of Michelle
in Rowland-Hall St. Mark's private school.
Record at 1059).

(Finding of Fact 18;

Finally, there is no basis for Defendant's claims

on page five of his Reply Brief, as indicated by Defendant's complete
failure to cite to the record or the trial court's findings of fact.
In fact, as previously shown, both the record and the trial court's
findings of fact support the trial court's determination on the
private school expenses matter.

See Brief of Appellee and Cross-

Appellant, Argument #1, pp. 17-24.
On page six of his Reply Brief, Defendant argues that "the Court
clearly erred in finding that Mr. Brooks had a financial ability to
pay a portion of Michelle's private school expenses."

In so doing,

Defendant fails to "marshal the evidence which support the finding
and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence, [it is] clearly
erroneous."

Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 1991);

1

In making its findings, the trial court explicitly noted that
Defendant had received additional income that the court was unable to
specifically identify. (Record at 222-23; 1056).
2

Contrary to Defendant's assertion, at the time of the divorce,
both of the parties were paying the costs associated with the private
preschool.
6

accord Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989).

A review of

the record and the findings of fact and conclusions of lawf reveals
that the trial court thoroughly reviewed all the evidence concerning
Defendant's ability to pay.

(Record at 1063; Finding of Fact 30).

The trial court, after considering the totality of the circumstances,
including Defendant's ability to pay, concluded that Defendant should
be

required

to

pay

one-half

of

his

daughter's

private

school

expenses.
Defendant argues, on page seven of his Reply Brief, that "[i]t
is axiomatic that there would have been no petition to modify or
trial in this matter if Mr. Brooks both wanted his daughter in
private school and had the ability to pay for such an education."
Such a conclusion, however, assumes that there are no other reasons
for Defendant's refusal to contribute to the expense of educating his
daughter, notwithstanding Defendant's express desire that Michelle
attend a private school.

(Record at 55, 1 11; 1135, lines 6-7; 1139,

lines 17-19; Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, Declaration of Thomas M. Brooks,
H 7, lines 11-19).

To the contrary, other reasons or conclusions can

be drawn from Defendant's refusal, such as Defendant's being too
cheap, that Defendant does not care about Michelle to the extent that
he would contribute to her education, or that Defendant only cares
about Michelle when someone else pays her way.

7

3.

THE TRIAL COURT NEITHER ERRED NOR DID IT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENDANT TO
OFFSET HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY ONE-HALF OF
MICHELLE'S PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES WITH HER
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS.

Argument II of Defendant's Reply Brief is essentially the same
argument made by Defendant in Argument II of his opening brief.
Plaintiff refuted Defendant's arguments regarding this issue in
Argument two of her opening brief. See Brief of Appellee and CrossAppellant, Argument #2, pp. 24-31.
reiterate her position again.

Therefore, Plaintiff will not

However, Plaintiff is compelled to

make some observations in reply to Defendant's argument.
In

the

process

of

making

his

argumentf

Defendant

mischaracterizes Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(8)(a) by claiming that
Utah allows such a credit.

Section 78-45-7.5(8)(a) provides:

Social Security benefits received by a child
due to the earnings of the parent may be
credited as child support to the parent upon
whose earning record it is based, by crediting
the amount against the potential obligation of
that parent. Other unearned income of a child
may be considered as income to a parent
depending upon the circumstances of each case.
(Emphasis added.)

As the clear language of the statute indicates,

the trial court is not required to allow such a credit.

Rather, by

use of the word "may," the legislature intended to allow the court
the exercise of its discretion in determining whether to allow such
a credit. The trial court in the instant case did just that.

In so

doing, the trial court indicated its reasons for refusing Defendant
a credit. First, the trial court recognized that the Social Security
benefits received by the minor child belong to her, and as such,
should not be used to meet her father's obligations.

8

(Record at

1060, Finding of Fact 21).

In other words, the minor child should

not be required to foot the bill for her own education, especially in
light of Defendant's desire that she attend a private school and his
ability to pay. Second, Defendant should fulfill his obligations for
one-half of the minor child's private school expenses from his own
resources and not from the minor child's Social Security benefits.
(Record at 1060, Finding of Fact 21).
3.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE AFTER THE
CONCLUSION OF TRIAL TO ESTABLISH AMOUNTS CLAIMED
AND SOUGHT AT TRIAL.

In the process of arguing that the trial court abused
discretion

in

allowing

Plaintiff

to

submit

evidence

after

its
the

conclusion of trial, Defendant misperceives the standard of review
for

reviewing

the

issue.

In

addition,

Defendant

again

mischaracterizes both the factual and procedural events leading to
both the trial court's request for and consideration of evidence, of
which Defendant complains.

The following statement of the relevant

factual and procedural events, as quoted in Plaintiff's
brief, is instructive:
Following trial and the court's April 26,
1991 minute entry, Plaintiff filed a motion for
clarification of the court's ruling. (Record at
292).
In the motion, Plaintiff stated that
disputes concerning the proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law needed to be
resolved, and that certain matters in the
court's minute entry needed clarification.
Following Defendant's response, the court, on
August 7, 1991, held a hearing on the motion.
(Record 419-82).
At the hearing, the trial
court ordered Plaintiff to submit a motion to
amend, pursuant to Utah Code of Jud. Admin. Rule
4-501, addressing the following:
(1) whether
Defendant should receive a credit for the minor
9

opening

child's Social Security benefits; (2) the amount
of expenses paid by Plaintiff to maintain the
minor child in private school; and (3) both the
amount of the medical and dental expenses and
transportation expenses paid for by Plaintiff.
(Record at 292, 459). In the process, the trial
court did not provide a deadline for filing the
motion (Record at 460, lines 5-8), but instead
allowed for its filing at "any time;" the court
allowed Defendant thirty days for response,
rather
than the Rule
4-501(1)(b)
ten-day
response time. (Record at 13-22). The court,
in setting the thirty-day response time, sought
to provide Defendant with the opportunity to
take depositions and anything else in response.
(Record at 459-60).
Because of the large amount of information
and time required to accumulate the information
requested by the court, Plaintiff, on November
1, 1991, in accordance with the trial court's
directive, filed her Motion for Post-trial
Determination of Divorce Modification Issues.
(Record at 527-731). Defendant responded with
his untimely memorandum
in opposition
on
December 6, 1991, which was more than the thirty
days granted by the court for response.3
(Record
at
747-53).
Defendant
filed
a
Supplement on December 16, 1991 (Record at 777),
and then he filed an "Answer" to the Plaintiff's
"Motion for Post-Trial Determination of Divorce
Modification Issues" on December 17, 1991.
(Record at 780). Plaintiff filed motions to
strike Defendant's untimely Supplement and
Answer (Record at 759 and 7 88), which the court
granted. (Record at 798).
The trial court soundly exercised its discretion in not holding
an evidentiary hearing on the motion.

Not only had the matters been

primarily decided at trial, the findings of fact and conclusions of
law indicate that the trial court extensively considered the evidence
and then ruled accordingly.

The functional equivalent of cross-

examination took place by virtue of the extensive submissions of the
parties, the evidence admitted at trial, and the resolution of the

3

Notwithstanding Defendant's untimely filing,
considered Defendant's memorandum. (Record at 796).
10

the

court

expenses issue by affidavitsf written objections, correspondencef and
meetings between the parties in the process of arriving at a
stipulation.

(Record at 1039-41; see Brief of Appellee and Cross-

Appellant, Statement of Facts 30-32, p. 15). Furthermore, the trial
court spent one full day of trial observing the credibility of the
witnesses who

subsequently

submitted

the

information

of which

the aforementioned

argument,

Defendant now complains.
In the process

of

advancing

Defendant distorts and misrepresents what is required under Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 43 by claiming that Rule 43 "requires testimony to
be presented orally at trial."

Rule 43 provides that "[w]hen a

motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear
the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the
court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions."

(Emphasis added). The plain language of

Rule 43 indicates that the requirement advanced by Defendant does not
exist.

Rather, the trial court is granted the discretion in

determining whether the matter should be heard on affidavits or
submissions of the respective parties.
As indicated by Defendant's argument, Defendant apparently
forgets

that

discretion.

the

instant

issue

is reviewed

for

an

abuse

of

See Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d

1142, 1143 (Utah 1977).

By virtue of his argument, Defendant would

have this Court review the trial court's ruling on the post-trialconsideration-of-evidence issue for what appears to be correction of
error.

Nothwithstanding Defendant's assertions, the record and the

trial court's findings of fact indicate that the court did not abuse
11

its discretion in allowing submission of evidence, after trial, to
establish amounts claimed and sought at trial.

4.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ADJUST
DEFENDANT'S TAX-FREE INCOME TO REFLECT — FOR
PURPOSES OF CHILD SUPPORT CALCULATION — A GROSS
INCOME EQUIVALENT TO A TAXABLE INCOME.

On page fourteen of his Reply Brief, Defendant argues that
"before the Court could take judicial notice of the calculation
offered by the Plaintiff, the Court first had to make a legal
determination as to whether the imputation of the additional amounts
was legally appropriate."

As indicated by Defendant's failure to

cite to any authority, there is no authority for his proposition.4
Additionally, Defendant states that Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5,
which governs the determination of gross income for purposes of
computing child support obligations, "does not differentiate between
taxable and non-taxable gross income, and there is no legal authority
upon which the Court may do so." Defendant's position is fallacious
inasmuch as Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1 et seq., Uniform Civil Liability
of Support Act, includes the "child support guidelines" set forth in
§ 78-45-7.2 through 7.18, which are rebuttable.
78-45-2(6) and 78-45-7.2(1).

Utah Code Ann. §§

Section 78-45-2(3) provides:

A written finding or specific finding on the
record supporting the conclusion that complying
with a provision of the guidelines or ordering
an award amount resulting from use of the
guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or
not in the best interest of a child in a

4

Defendant also makes the naked assertion that "the concept of
judicial notice is not applicable to this issue and is, in fact,
completely irrelevant."
Again, Defendant fails to support his
assertion with any citation of authority.

12

particular case is sufficient
presumption in that case.

to rebut the

In the instant case, the trial court should have found, based on
the evidence concerning Defendant's tax-free disability income, that
literally complying with § 78-45-7.5, in terms of determining the
gross income of the parties, "would be unjust, inappropriate, or not
in the best interests" of the minor child, Michelle. It was neither
just nor appropriate for Plaintiff's share of child support to be
based on taxable income while Defendant's share of child support was
based on tax-free income.
Under § 78-45-7.5, the trial court has the responsibility to
equitably determine the gross income of the parties, which the court
failed to do in the best interests of the minor child.

The court's

refusal to make such a determination, by not adjusting Defendant's
tax-free pension, was an abuse of discretion. See Brief of Appellee
and Cross-Appellant, Argument #6, 41-43.
5.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
AWARDING JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF FOR ONE-HALF
THE COSTS OF THE TRANSPORTATION FOR DEFENDANT'S
VISITATION WITH MICHELLE FROM AND AFTER THE DATE
OF FILING OF THE AMENDED PETITION TO MODIFY THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE.

In the process of arguing that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in regard to this issue, Defendant makes a number of naked
and unsupported assertions.5 First, there is no basis in the record
for Defendant's assertion concerning Mr. Nunley's gross income, and
therefore, the assertion should be stricken.

5

Second, Defendant's

Plaintiff has no contention with the claim made by Defendant
in the second paragraph on page sixteen. In fact, to argue otherwise
would be inconsistent with Plaintiff's position concerning the issue.

13

deceptive use of gross sales by Plaintiff's business —

by throwing

out a six-figure sum without any reference to net business income or
Plaintiffs stipulated income of $833.00 gross per month (which was
specifically found by the trial court) —

is a blatant attempt to

prejudice Plaintiff on appeal. Third, the trial court specifically
found that it could not order Plaintiff's husband to provide flight
benefits to Michelle for visitation purposes.
13).

(See Finding of Fact

Finally, Defendant's naked assertion that Plaintiff, at the

time of trial, was refusing to allow Defendant to exercise visitation
unless he paid all associated costs is outrageous, to say the least,
and should be stricken from the record on appeal.
The trial court abused its discretion in requiring Plaintiff to
pay one-half of the visitation transportation

expenses because

Defendant, based on Defendant's significant increase in income as
compared to Plaintiff's substantial decrease in income, is in a
better position to pay the transportation expenses.
Defendant has the ability to pay.

Furthermore,

See Brief of Appellee and Cross-

Appellant, Argument #8, pp. 44-46.
6.

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THIS COURT SHOULD
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS FOR DEFENDING
PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-APPEAL IS TOTALLY LACKING IN
MERIT.

Defendant claims that "the issues on which Mrs. Nunley has
chosen to cross appeal are frivolous and without legal and factual
basis."

In so doing, Defendant, pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure 33 and 34, requests costs and attorney fees incurred in
defending Plaintiff's cross-appeal.
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Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that "if
the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages
. . . as defined in rule 34 and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the
prevailing party."

Subsection (b) provides that "[f]or purposes of

these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one
that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing
law."

Accord Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d

1157 (Utah App. 1988); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App.
1989).

In determining whether an appeal is frivolous, sanctions for

frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious cases, so as to
avoid chilling the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions.
See Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988).
Upon review of Plaintiff's primary brief and Reply brief, the
issues raised by Plaintiff on her cross-appeal are clearly grounded
in fact, warranted by existing law, and based on goods faith
arguments to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.

The merit of

Plaintiff's issues on cross-appeal is borne out by Defendant's own
effort to refute Plaintiff's arguments on cross-appeal.

In fact,

Defendant's argument (that Plaintiff's issues on cross-appeal are
frivolous) is frivolous itself.
CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence before it, the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to modify the divorce decree to require
Defendant to pay an increased amount of child support.

15

The trial,

however, did not abuse its discretion in modifying the decree of
divorce to require Defendant to pay one-half of Michelle's private
school expenses.
discretion

in

Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its

allowing

Plaintiff

to

submit

evidence

after

the

conclusion of trial to establish amounts claimed and sought at trial.
By refusing to adjust Defendant's tax-free income to reflect —
purposes of child support calculation —
a taxable income, the trial court erred.

for

a gross income equivalent to
The trial court abused its

discretion by awarding judgment against Plaintiff for one-half of the
costs of the transportation for Defendant's visitation with Michelle
from and after the date of filing of the amended petition to modify
the decree of divorce.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of January, 1994.

RANDALL J. HOLMG
HOLMGREN, ARNOLD
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CLAIMS CONCERNING CROSS-EXAMINATION
THE JAILHOUSE INFORMANT CONCERNING
RAP SHEET AND EXPUNGED CONVICTIONS
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FABRICATE OR LIE.
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OF
HIS
AS
TO

(Responding to State's brief at Statement of Issues
Nos. 3-5 and Standard of Review (p. 2 ) , and
Point II (pp. 26-36) .
The controversy concerning Mr. Kingsbury's record arose
in the context of defense counsel's cross examination concerning
the aggravated assault charges pending against Mr. Kingsbury and
the

potential

testimony.

benefits

he

might

See T.2 at 175-177.

gained

in

exchange

for

The following transpired:

[By Mr. Valdez] Now, with a conviction of another
felony, that could, in fact, land you in the prison,
isn't that right, Mr. Kingsbury?
MS. HORNAK: Objection. Again, he's referring
to another felony, as though Mr. Kingsbury has a record,
and I think it is prejudicial.
MR. VALDEZ: Well, let me ask him about his
record, then.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MS. HORNAK: I will object to that because that
is prejudicial to the relevant -MR. VALDEZ: I think that the iurv#s entitled
to know if he has a record and has something to gain from
this* His testimony --

his

THE COURT: We are not talking about his prior
record.
You may talk about the charges -- not
necessarily the nature of the charges -- but the charges
that are pending.
The objection is sustained.
T.2 at 176-7 (emphasis added).

Defense counsel articulated his

position that the jury is entitled to examine Mr. Kingsbury's
record to the extent that it impacts on his bias and motive to lie.
The trial court interrupted counsel and summarily sustained the
State's objection.

No waiver has occurred.1

Additionally, the trial court expressly ruled on Mr.
Stevenson's contention concerning admissibility for purposes of
showing bias and motive to lie when he denied Mr. Stevenson's
petition for certificate of probable cause.

In support of this

petition, Mr. Stevenson filed a copy of his amended brief with the
trial court.

R. 195-291.

In denying the petition for certificate

of probable cause, the trial court stated:
Defendant's Motion for Certificate of Probable
Cause is denied.
Defendant has not demonstrated that
there are substantial issues of law or fact likely to
result in reversal or a new trial.
The court premises its decision on a review of
the appellate briefs in this matter. Additionally, the
defendant has not demonstrated that there is any manner
[sic] in Mr, Kingsbury's criminal history which could
have been utilized at trial,
R. 324 (Summary Decision and Order)(emphasis added).

Even if Mr.

Stevenson had originally waived the objection, the trial court's
actions in addressing the issue on the merits revives the claim.
State v. Seale, 853 P. 2d 862, 870

(Utah)

("Because the court

^•Furthermore, an off the record discussion occurred shortly
thereafter. T.2 at 177-8. There may have been further discussion
of the bias/motive basis for admissibility at that time.
2

considered the alleged error rather than finding it waived, Seale's
right to assert the issue on appeal was resuscitated. ") , cert.
denied,

U.S.

, 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993);

P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992);
(Utah 1991);

State v. Belcrard, 830

State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161

State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991).

Mr. Stevenson's objection to the failure of the State to
provide a clean rap sheet is contained in the record at T. 27-2 9.
The State even admits as much.

State's brief at 26-27.

The

State's assertion that "defendant's objection to the prosecutor's
alleged failure to provide him with a clean copy of Kingsbury's rap
sheet is raised for the first time on appeal", State's brief at 31,
is belied by the State's own admission.

No waiver has occurred.

POINT II. THE RAPE ELEMENTS JURY INSTRUCTION
USED BY THE COURT WAS NOT PROPOSED BY
DEFENDANT, AND THERE IS NO INVITED ERROR.
(Responding to State's brief at Point III (pp. 3739)
The State argues that the lack of a non-Spouse element in
the rape elements jury instruction is invited error, and thus not
reviewable on appeal.

The rape elements instruction used by the

trial court is neither that proposed by the prosecutor, nor that
proposed by defendant.

Compare R. 76 (defendant's proposed) with

R. 119 (actually used) (copies are contained in State's brief at
addendum F ) .

The trial court apparently prepared its own elements

instruction.

Because defendant's instruction was not used, there

is no invited error here.

Even without an objection at trial, the

3

erroneous elements instruction requires reversal. State v. Jones,
823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991).

CONCLUSION
The State's waiver and invited error arguments are
without merit.

Mr. Stevenson's claims should be addressed on the

merits.

j
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^

day of May, 1994.

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JAMES A. VALDEZ
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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